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ABSTRACT: This brief chapter surveys some of the economic literature concerning the
instrumental costs of material inequality. Economic theory predicts, and econometric evidence
finds, that inequality increases crime and political corruption and, in certain circumstances,
constrains growth. 
 Most famously, see Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD .1
103 (1979); Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norms in Common Law
Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L.REV. 487 (1980).
 A. Mitchell Polinsky, Economic Analysis As a Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer’s Guide to2
Posner’s Economic Analysis of Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1655, 1679-80 (1974). Indeed, Posner has since made some
concessions about the incompleteness of wealth maximization. See Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and
Tort Law: A Philosophical Inquiry, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW  (David G. Owen, ed., 1995).
 See LOUIS KAPLOW  &  STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 28-38 (2002)3
2
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Forthcoming in THE ROLE OF RACE IN LAW, MARKETS, AND SOCIAL STRUCTURES 
(E.C. Jordan & C.J. Ogletree, eds., Russell Sage 2007).
Despite its reputation, economics has a great deal to say about inequality. The economic
starting point is the distinction between allocation from distribution. Allocative issues concern
how best to use resources to produce the most value to society, i.e., to produce the combination
of goods and services that the individuals in society value the most. Distributive issues concern
who gets to consume the goods and services once produced. Early law and economics scholars
tended to focus entirely on issues of allocation by using a normative metric – wealth
maximization or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency – that self-consciously gave no weight to distributional
concerns.  But wealth maximization was never the dominant normative criteria in the larger1
discipline of economics. When Richard Posner first articulated a theory of law based on wealth
maximization, economists such as Mitchell Polinsky criticized the theory for ignoring the
distributional analysis of welfare economics.  More recently, Louis Kaplow and Steve Shavell2
take great care to explain that welfare economics evaluates states of the world by considering any
and all effects the state has on the well-being of individuals, which obviously includes a
consideration of distribution.3
 See KENNETH J. ARROW , SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951); JOHN C. HARSANYI, RATIONAL4
BEHAVIOR AND BARGAINING EQUILIBRIUM IN GAM ES AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS, ch. 4 (1977); AM ARTYA SEN , CHOICE,
WELFARE AND MEASUREM ENT (1982). See also the discussion and citations in KAPLOW  &  SHAVELL, supra note 3, at
15-38. One could also venture outside of welfarism to explore Amartya Sen’s concern with developing individual
“capabilities,” which implies a need for greater equality. See AM ARTYA SEN , COMM ODITIES AND CAPABILITIES
(1985).
 Kaplow and Shavell famously claim that society should redistribute only through the tax system. See Louis5
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23
J. LEGAL STUD . 667 (1994); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the
Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD . 821 (2000). For criticisms, see
Chris W. Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules AS Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD . 797 (2000); R. Avraham, D. Fortus, & Kyle Logue, Revisiting the Roles of Legal Rules and Tax Rules in
Income Redistribution: A Response to Kaplow and Shavell, 89 IOW A L. REV. 1125 (2004).
3
Indeed, there are so many links between economic theory and inequality, I should first
identify the paths I will not explore. One possibility is to construct and defend a “social welfare
function” that gives intrinsic weight to equality of welfare.  In other words, within the tools of4
welfare economics, one can argue against the utilitarian ideal that seeks to maximize the sum of
individual utilities in favor of some sort of egalitarian ideal that seeks to maximize a function
that gives weight to the equality of welfare, as by maximizing the product of individual utilities.
As I explain, however, this sort of “high theory” is not the focus of this chapter. Another issue for
the economics of inequality concerns the means of redistribution, including whether one should
redistribute wealth only through the tax system or, in addition, via legal doctrine. This point has
generated an interesting literature,  but again, that is not my subject. 5
In this chapter, I want to show how economics addresses the big picture question – why
should we care about inequality? – without assuming a welfare function that values equality
intrinsically. I examine a more mundane and practical part of the economic answer: an account of
the economic costs of inequality. Given any plausible conception of social welfare, certain effects
of material inequality are bad. 
 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON . 169 (1968).6
4
Economics more famously identifies the benefits of income and wealth inequality. To the
extent that inequality is meritocratic – so that those who contribute more to social welfare receive
more personal wealth – unequal material rewards will encourage greater effort and risk-taking,
including greater investment in human capital. Obviously, an issue of great dispute is exactly
how meritocratic the observed inequality in an economy is, how much inequality is the product
of greater effort or risk-taking. But given the social productivity of meritocratic inequality,
economics offers a strong reason to avoid guaranteeing complete material equality. Such a
guarantee would undermine the incentives for work, investment, and risk-taking that are vital to
production. 
The question I address, however, is whether economics offers any instrumental reasons to
avoid – at the opposite end of the spectrum – maximal inequality. Are there economic costs of
inequality that must be weighed against the economic benefits? The answer is clearly yes. Even
without giving a complete catalogue of those costs, in what follows, I address the economic
theory and empiricism on the link between inequality and (1) crime; (2) corruption; and (3) poor
growth.
I. INEQUALITY INCREASES CRIME
The standard economic prediction is that material inequality increases crime. The
economic theory of crime views the decision to offend as a rational response to costs and
benefits.  The decision to steal, for example, involves a choice between two different ways of6
generating income: one can invest time in lawful production or in appropriating the property of
others. The more that one’s expected monetary returns from illegal work exceed that of legal
 To be more precise, if one’s expected returns are net of all costs, including non-monetary costs like guilt7
and shame, then one will offend if one’s expected returns from offending exceed one’s expected returns from not
offending.
 See Isaac Ehrlich, Participation in Illegitimate Activities: An Economic Analysis, in ESSAYS IN THE8
ECONOM ICS OF CRIM E AND PUNISHMENT 68, 87 (Gary S. Becker & William M. Landes eds. 1974). An earlier study,
not by economists, but reaching the same conclusion is P. Eberts & K. Schwirian. Metropolitan Crime Rates and
Relative Deprivation, 5 CRIM INOLOGICA 43 (1968).
  See Edward L. Glaeser, Inequality, HIER Discussion Paper 2078 (July 2005). See also RICHARD A.9
POSNER, ECONOM IC ANALYSIS OF LAW  508 (5  ed. 1998)(“The forgone income of a legitimate alternative occupationth
in low for someone who has little earning capacity in legitimate occupations, while the proximity of wealth increases
the expected return from crime.”).
5
work, the more likely one is to offend.  Of course, sometimes one can both work lawfully and7
steal when the opportunity arises. But because owners act to protect their property from theft and
the police seek to apprehend thieves, much casual theft is prevented or deterred. By contrast,
professional theft is productive only because one has invested the time to learn generic skills and
the facts needed for a particular “job.” To some extent one chooses between the occupation of
thievery and a lawful occupation. 
If so, then as Isaac Ehrlich noted decades ago, those with “legitimate returns” that are
“well below the median have greater differential returns from property crimes and, hence, a
greater incentive to participate in such crimes, relative to those with income well above the
median.”  As Edward Glaeser puts it: “[A]s inequality rises, the returns to crime increase for the8
poor (because rich victims because richer) and the opportunity costs of crime are lower (because
the poor are poorer).”  Conversely, with significant equality, those at the bottom are more likely9
to prefer their lawful means of generating income to stealing from those with only slightly more
wealth. The theory thus predicts a positive relationship between inequality and property crimes,
such as car theft, burglary, and robbery. The theory implies a similar positive relationship for any
crime motivated in part by the acquisition of material value. Thus, black market crimes such as
 Earling Eide, Economics of Criminal Behavior, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOM ICS, VOLUM E V.10
THE ECONOM ICS OF CRIM E AND LITIGATION  345, 361 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest, eds., 2000).
 See, e.g., Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors That Explain the11
Decline and Six That Do Not, 18 J. ECON . PERSP.163 (2004); Steven D. Levitt, Using Electoral Cycles In Police
Hiring To Estimate The Effects Of Police On Crime: Reply, 92 AM ER. ECON . REV. 1244 (2002).
6
drug trafficking should rise with inequality, as should financially-motivated murder, e.g., in
violent clashes with rival drug suppliers.
In addition to Ehrlich’s initial theory, there are two more economic reasons one might
expect inequality to increase crime. One reason is that inequality may dilute the deterrent effect
of legal sanctions.  The dominant punishment in many wealthy nations, at least for serious10
crimes, is prison, yet the deterrent effect of prison depends on the perceived difference between
life in prison and life out of prison. In a wealthy nation, prison may work well as a deterrent of
the citizen of average wealth because the perceived difference is so great. But in a nation that
forgoes torture and inhumane treatment of prisoners, the poorest citizen may live almost as badly
outside of prison as he would inside prison, or at least the gap, and hence the deterrent, is much
smaller. Thus, in economic theory, the costs of prison are lower for the poor. Inequality therefore
negatively affects the deterrent efficiency of prison; more inequality means there are more people
for whom prison threatens a lower cost. Of course, inequality means that there are more rich
citizens who are especially deterred by the threat of prison, but because the relatively poor have
the greatest incentive to offend (for the reasons Ehrlich gave), the loss of deterrence for them
outweighs the gain in deterrence of the rich. 
Finally, inequality may adversely affect the level of policing. According to economic
theory and empiricism, more police raise the probability of detecting crime and therefore
decreases crime.  But the provision of a public good like policing requires collective political11
 Edward L. Glaeser, “Inequality,” KSG Faculty Working Paper 05-056 at 11 (Oct. 2005).12
 Id. at 10.13
7
action that is most likely when the actors are homogeneous in their demand for the good. When
citizens are instead heterogenous, differing in the type of good and the quantity they demand, the
cost of their political organization is higher and the government will provide less of the good.
Glaeser explains:
For example, the rich might want a legal system focused on protecting property
while the poor might be more concerned with preventing interpersonal violence in
disadvantaged areas. Because these groups disagree, there is less willingness to
invest in a common legal system than there would be if the population shared a
common set of legal needs.12
One might add that the relatively rich are more capable of hiring their own private security
(hiring as security guards those who otherwise have poor prospects for lawful income) and
therefore opposing taxes that would pay for public police that also protect the poor from crime.
To illustrate this point, Glaeser compares Bogota, Columbia, which has 12,000 police officers,
with New York City, which has 28,000. “These two cities have similar populations, but
Columbia is a particularly unequal nation.”13
To my knowledge, no one has tested Glaeser’s precise point because the studies tend to
control for the level of policing (rather than measuring an effect of inequality on police). But
considerable empirical evidence supports the general claim of the first two theories that
inequality increases crime. In an early economic study, Erhlich examined crime levels among the
states in 1940, 1950, and 1960 and found that “[c]rimes against property (robbery, burglary,
 Ehrlich, supra note xx, at 94. See also Belton M. Fleisher, The Effect of Income on Delinquency, 5614
AM ER. ECON . REV. 118 (1966).
 Ching-Chi Hsieh & M. Pugh, Poverty, Income Inequality, and Violent Crime: A Meta-Analysis of Recent15
Aggregate Data Studies, 18 CRIM . JUSTICE REV. 182 (1993)(applying meta-analysis to 34 aggregate data studies
reporting “76 zero-order correlation coefficients for all measures of violent crime with either poverty or income
inequality,” of which “all but 2, or 97 percent, were positive” and, of those, “nearly 80 percent were of at least
moderate strength,” meaning greater than 0.25).
 See Rodrigo Reis Soares, “Development, Crime, and Punishment: Accounting for the International16
Differences in Crime Rates” (unpublished manuscript, March 28, 2000).
 See id. at 27, Table 1, which categorizes the following fourteen studies: R. Allen, Socioeconomic17
Conditions and Property Crime: A Comprehensive Review and Test of the Professional Literature. 55 AM ER. J.
ECON. &  SOC. 293 (1996)(using a time series of U.S. national data and finding no significant effect of inequality on
crime); W.C. Bailey, Poverty, Inequality, and City Homicide Rates, 22 CRIM INOLOGY  531 (1984)(using a cross-
section analysis of U.S. city data and finding no significant effect on murder); P.M. Blau, & J.R. Blau, The Cost of
Inequality: Metropolitan Structure and Violent Crime, 47 AM ER. SOC. REV. 114 (1982)(using cross-section analysis
of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) and finding a positive effect on murder and assault and no
significant effect on rape or robery); L. Carrol & P. Jackson. Inequality, Opportunity, and Crime Rates in Central
Cities, 21 CRIM INOLOGY  178 (1983)(using cross-section analysis of U.S. cities data and finding a positive effect of
inequality on burglary, robbery, and crime against the person); S. Danzinger & D. Wheeler, The Economics of
Crime: Punishment or Income Redistribution, 33 REV. SOCIAL ECONOM Y  113 (1975)(using U.S. national data for
time series and finding a positive effect on robbery and no significant effect on burglary or assault; using cross-
section analysis of SMSA and finding a positive effect on burglary, assault, and robbery); P. Eberts & K. Schwirian.
Metropolitan Crime Rates and Relative Deprivation, 5 CRIM INOLOGICA 43 (1968)(using cross section analysis of
SMSA data and finding positive effect on total crime); P. Fanjzylber,  D. Lederman & N. Loayza. Determinants of
Crime Rates in Latin America and the World: An Empirical Assessment, World Bank Latin American and Caribbean
Studies - Viewpoints, Washington, 1998 (using cross-country panel data and finding a positive effect on homicide
and robbery); R. Fowles & M. Merva, Wage Inequality and Criminal Activity: An Extreme Bounds Analysis for the
United States, 1975-90, 34 CRIM INOLOGY  163 (1996) (using panel date for SMSA and finding a positive effect on
aggravated assault, murder, and larceny, no significant effect on car theft, robbery, or burglary, and a negative effect
8
larceny, and auto theft) . . . vary positively with the percentage of families below one-half of the
median income.”  After Ehrlich’s 1973 study, sociologists and economists explored the issue14
using different data and different statistical methods. Hsieh and Pugh conducted a meta-analysis
of the literature in 1993 and found significant link between income inequality and violent
crime.  In 2000, Rodrigo Reis Soares reviewed and summarized the literature, finding it more15
mixed.  Though there almost no studies finding a negative relationship, quite a few found no16
significant relationship to go along with quite a few finding a positive relationship between
inequality and crime.  17
on rape); D. Jacobs, Inequality and Economic Crime, 66 SOCIOLOGY &  SOC. RES. 12 (1981)(using cross-section
analysis of SMSA data and finding a positive relationship on burglary, grand larceny, and robbery); M. Kelly,
Inequality and Crime, 82 REV. ECON . &  STATISTICS 530 (2000) (using cross-section analysis of U.S. county data and
finding a strong and robust effect on violent crime, but no significant effect on property crime); S.F. Messner,
Poverty, Inequality, and the Urban Homicide Rate, 20 CRIMINOLOGY  103 (1982) (using a cross-section analysis of
SMSA data and finding no significant effect on murder); E. Patterson, Poverty, Income Inequality, and Community
Crime Rates, 29 CRIM INOLOGY  755 (1991) (using cross-section analysis on U.S. neighborhood data and finding no
significant effect on burglary or violent crime); S. Stack, Income Inequality and Property Crime: A Cross-National
Analysis of Relative Deprivation Theory, 22 CRIM INOLOGY  229 (1984) (using cross-section analysis across nations
and finding a negative effect on property crime); K.R. Williams, Economic Sources of Homicide: Reestimating the
Effects of Poverty and Inequality, 49 AM ER. SOC. REV. 283 (1984)(using a cross-section analysis of SMSA data and
finding no significant effect on homicide).
 Id. at 19.18
9
In more recent years, the issue has attracted increasing attention, and the newer wave of
studies tends to confirm that inequality causes crime. Some of these studies introduce interesting
methodological refinements. Soares, for example, notes that prior studies relied overwhelmingly
on reported crime, even thought there is significant under-reporting of crime. Soares finds that
under-reporting systematically distorts the analysis of the link between inequality and crime and
therefore examines the connection in two new ways: first, using victimization surveys and,
second, using a statistical adjustment to reported crime. In the two cross-section analyses of
international data, he finds a significant and positive relationship: inequality increases thefts,
burglaries, and contact crimes such as robbery and assault. The effect is robust across
specifications and quite large: in one specification, “a one time increase in the GDP per capita of
the richest 20% in relation to the GDP per capita of the poorest 20% would imply an increase of
3.4%, 13.1%, and 10.1% in the rates of, respectively, thefts, burglaries, and contact crimes.”18
Matz Dahlbert and Magnus Gustavsson offer a different innovation: separating the effects
of transitory changes in income from permanent changes. Using Swedish panel data from 1974 to
2000, they found that, while an increase in inequality of transitory income had no effect on crime,
 See Matz Dahlberg & Magnus Gustavsson, Inequality and Crime: Separating the Effects of Permanent19
and Transitory Income Uppsala University Working Paper Series 2005:20 (June 27, 2005).
 François Bourguignon, Jairo Nuñez and Fabio Sanchez, “What part of the income distribution does20
matter for explaining crime? The case of Colombia,” DELTA Working Paper #2003-04 (2002).
 Anna Nilsson, Income Inequality and Crime: The Case of Sweden, IFAU Working Paper 2004:6 (4 May21
2004).
 Id. at xx. For a similar result involving South Africa, see Gabriel Demombynes & Berk Ozler, Crime and22
Local Inequality in South Africa, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2925 (2002)(controlling for police
expenditures, unemployment, and inequality within a given police precinct, burglary rates, but not other crimes, “are
20% higher in jurisdictions that are the wealthiest among their neighbors”).
10
an increase in the inequality of permanent income significantly increased total crime.  Other19
studies seek to separate the effects of inequality on the poorest from the more general effect.
François Bourguignon, Jairo Nuñez and Fabio Sanchez  use panel data from seven Colombian20
cities over 20 years to isolate the effect inequality has on a particular group – those living in
households where per capita income was below 80% of the mean. Though variations in
inequality affecting those above this group did not affect crime rates, variations in inequality
affecting this group did to a significant degree. Similarly, Anna Nilsson used individual level
panel data to examine the effect of income inequality in Sweden from 1973 to 2000.  She found21
a significant positive effect that the proportion of the population with income below 10% of the
median on the incidence of property crime. Specifically, a “one-percentage point increase in the
proportion of the population with an income below 10 percent of the median income would
increase . . . the burglary rate with 5.9 percent, the number of auto thefts with 22.1 and the
robbery rate with 9.1 percent, everything else held constant.”22
Perhaps the most econometrically sophisticated study is the one Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel
 See Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman, and Norman Loayza, Inequality and Violent Crime, 45 J. LAW  &23
ECON. 1 (2002). See also Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman & Norman Loayza, Crime and Victimization: An
Economic Perspective, 1 ECONOM IA 219 (2001).
 A related but smaller literature links crime to wages by showing that declining wages for the least skilled24
workers increases crime. See Eric D. Gould, Bruce A. Weinberg, and David B. Mustard, Crime Rates And Local
Labor Market Opportunities In The United States: 1979-1997, 84 REV. ECON . &  STAT. 45 (2002); Jeff Grogger,
Market Wages and Youth Crime,  16 J. Law & Econ. 756 (1998); Richard B. Freeman, Why Do So Many Young
American Men Commit Crimes and What Might We Do about It?, 10 J. ECON . PERSP. 25 (1996).
 Id. at 26. “This result is robust to changes in the crime rate when it is used as the dependent variable25
(whether homicide or robbery), the sample of countries and periods, alternative measures of income inequality, the
set of additional variables explaining crime rates (control variables), and the method of econometric estimation.” Id.
at 25.
 The Gini Index measures the deviation between a perfectly equal distribution of income (or, alternatively,26
wealth) and the actual distribution. Graphically, if a horizontal axis represents the percentage of the population and
the vertical axis represents the percentage of society’s income, then one can represent perfect equality with a
diagonal line from (0, 0) to (100, 100). Each additional percentage point of the population holds exactly one more
percent of the income. In an unequal society, a (Lorenz) curve can represent the income of each individual in society,
starting with the poorest and moving to the richest. The curve starts at the beginning of the diagonal (because 0% of
the population must hold 0% of income), but falls below it because the poorest X% of individuals have less than X%
of society’s income. The Gini Coefficient and Gini Index are measures of the size of the difference in the diagonal
and the Lorenz curve for a society. See Kuan Xu, How Has the Literature on Gini’s Index Evolved in the Past 80
Years? (Dalhousie Univ. Dept. of Economics Working Paper)(Jan. 2004).
11
Lederman, and Norman Loayza published in the Journal of Law and Economics in 2002.  They23
report on panel data consisting of 5-year averages for 39 countries during 1965-95 for homicides
and 37 countries during 1970-94 for robberies.  Across and within countries, they study the24
correlation between inequality as defined by various measures and crime, measured by robbery
and homicide, while controlling for other influences on the crime rate and various forms of
measurement error. They conclude that “[c]rime rates and inequality are positively correlated
(within each country and, particularly, between countries), and it appears that this correlation
reflects causation from inequality to crime rates, even controlling for other crime determinants.”25
Specifically, they find that if “the Gini index”  – a standard measure of income inequality –26
“falls permanently by the within-country standard deviation in the sample (about 2.4 percentage
 Id. at 17.27
 Id. at 18. Eric Neumayer takes issue with these finding in Inequality and Violent Crime: Evidence from28
Data on Robbery and Violent Theft, 42 J. PEACE RES. 101 (2005).
 Ayse Imrohoroglu and Antonio Merlo, What Accounts for the Decline in Crime?, 45 INTERNAT’L ECON .29
REV. (2004).
 Id. at 2.30
 Id. at 3.31
 Id. at 14-15.32
12
points), the intentional homicide rate will decrease by 3.7 percent in the short run and 20 percent
in the long run.”  They also find that “a decline of 1 within-country standard deviation in the27
Gini coefficient (about 2.1 percent) leads to a 6.5 percent decline of the robbery rate in the short
run and a 23.2 percent decline in the long run.”28
To illustrate the possible magnitude of the effects within the United States, consider the
findings of Ayse Imrohoroglu, Antonio Merlo, and Peter Rupert.  Their primary goal was not to29
explore the relationship between inequality and crime but to answer a question vexing
economists: what explains the recent drop in crime in the United States? Much of the drop was in
property crime – burglary, larceny, robbery, and motor vehicle theft – which fell from a rate of
5.6 per 100 inhabitants in 1980 to 4.65 in 1996.  These researchers found three primary causes30
of the decline: a greater probability of apprehension, a stronger economy, and the aging of the
population (a relative decline in 20-28 year old males).  In addition, they found a major31
influence on crime working against the decline: the “marked increase” in income inequality
during this time period (from a standard deviation of 0.397 to 0.476).  Thus, the crime drop32
would have been much larger had there not been this rise in inequality. Specifically, “[b]y
holding inequality constant at its 1980 level we could have observed a 55% drop in property
 Id. at xx. See also Francois Bourguignon, Crime as a Social Cost of Poverty and Inequality: A Review33
Focusing on Developing Countries, in Shahid Yusuf, Simon Evenett and Weiping Wu, eds., FACETS OF
GLOBALIZATION  (2001). 
 See Gary LaFree, A Summary and Review of Cross-National Comparative Studies of Homicide, in34
HOMICIDE: A  SOURCEBOOK OF SOCIAL RESEARCH (M. Dwayne Smith & Margaret A. Zahn, eds., 1999)(positive link
between inequality and homicide is one of the most robust findings of cross-national crime research).
13
crime [by 1996] as opposed to a 17% drop.”33
In sum, though the empirical connection between inequality and crime is not fully
resolved and requires more study, there is significant evidence that it is real and substantial.  An34
economic cost of inequality is greater crime.
II. INEQUALITY CORRUPTS DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
In a democratic society, economic theory predicts that material inequality will increase
political corruption. One reason runs parallel to the above discussion of crime (and indeed, much
corruption is criminal), but the effect works on the rich rather than the poor. When everyone has
the same material wealth, it is difficult for any one person to “buy” government officials or
agencies. The point is most easily understood by focusing on two individuals. Suppose A and B
each wish to influence a court case, municipal legislation, or zoning board decision in
inconsistent ways. Each considers offering a bribe to C, the relevant judge, legislator, or zoning
board member. The “income effect” means that the maximum size of the bribe each is willing to
offer depends on, among other things, the individual’s income. If A and B have the same income
as C, then the maximum bribe either will offer will be lower and less tempting than if either A or
B has much greater wealth than C. Being less, it is less likely to be accepted and therefore, given
the risk of criminal sanctions, more likely to be deterred and never offered. Similarly, if A and B
have the same income as each other, then it is possible neither will offer a bribe that the other can
 See Edward Glaeser, Jose Scheinkman, & Andrei Shleifer, The Injustice of Inequality, 50 J. MONETARY35
ECON. 199, 200 (2003).
 The story becomes more complex when we consider more than two individuals and apply interest group36
theory, but the essential point remains: it is harder for citizens to influence political actors with money when
everyone has the same amount of money than it is for those who have a lot more than others. In general, an interest
group’s influence depends on a variety of factors, but one is the amount of resources its members are willing to bring
to bear to influence official action. One might think that the larger the interest group, the more influence it would
have, but the offsetting effect is organizational costs which rise with the number of members. MANCUR OLSEN, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) sparked a large literature
exploring how small groups have an advantage in organizing to use government power to enrich themselves at the
expense of the rest of society. Wealth exacerbates this problem because now a smaller group is not only easier to
organize, but may also now have greater resources than the much larger majority group it opposes. Even where
groups of equal size care equally about some issue (as with individuals A and B), inequality means that the relative
wealth of some give them an incentive to use their wealth to influence officials.
14
simply match.
By contrast, inequality increases the chance that some private citizen, A or B, has
sufficient resources, relative to C, to make a bribe tempting to C. And if A and B have highly
unequal wealth, then the wealthier can bribe C without having to worry that the other can nullify
the effect of the bribe by matching it. As the economists Edward Glaeser, Jose Scheinkman, and
Andrei Shleifer put it: “If one person is sufficiently richer than another, and courts are
corruptible, then the legal system will favor the rich, not the just.”  Thus, where inequality35
causes the poor to commit more theft-related crime, inequality causes the rich to commit more
crimes of corruption because, the richer they are, the more productive their bribes are likely to be.
Political influence should operate as a “luxury” good in that we expect an individual to use a
greater percentage of his income on such good the more wealth he has relative to others in
society.36
Much economic theory focuses on a different reason to expect inequality to increase
corruption. Inequality creates a divisive political issue – redistribution. In a democracy, the
greater the inequality, the greater the expected demand for redistribution. At least in the common
 See Jong-sung You & Sanjeev Khagram, A Comparative Study of Inequality and Corruption, 70 AM ER.37
SOC. REV. 136, 138 (2005).
 Glaeser, Scheinkman & Shleifer, supra note xx, at 200.38
 Id.39
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situation where the median income falls below the mean income (because wealth is skewed
toward the upward levels since it is bounded by zero at the lower level), the median voter would
gain by redistribution. So inequality creates a reason for the rich to defeat the political
preferences of the majority for redistribution. “As income inequality increases, the rich have
more to lose through fair political, administrative, and judicial processes . . . [and] will also have
greater resources that can be used to buy influence, both legally and illegally.”  Being a37
minority, the rich cannot rely on voting power to prevent redistribution; they must use their
superior wealth to influence the political process. 
As a normative matter, some may defend this non-majoritarian outcome as being fair or
efficient, at least if the rich earn their wealth by superior effort, talent, or risk-taking. But the
problem does not end with non-redistribution. Where median voter theory predicts the demand
for redistribution from the rich to the poor – what Glaeser, Scheinkman, & Shleifer call “Robin
Hood Redistribution,” – we often observe the opposite – “King John Redistribution” from the
poor to the rich.  Once the rich invest in corrupting the political process, they don’t stop at38
defeating redistribution to the poor. “[T]he haves can redistribute from the have-nots by
subverting legal, political and regulatory institutions to work in their favor. They can do so
through political contributions, bribes, or just deployments of legal and political resources to get
their way.”  Glaeser, Scheinkman & Schleifer argue that inequality thus leads to the corruption39
of institutions, particularly the judiciary, a point for which they provide two compelling examples
 Id. at 211-14.40
 Jong-sung You & Sanjeev Khagram, A Comparative Study of Inequality and Corruption, 70 AM ER. SOC.41
REV. 136 (2005).
 Id. at 147.42
 Id. at 149.43
 You & Khagram, supra note xx, at 152-53.44
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– the Gilded Age in the United States and the former Soviet transition economies of the 1990s.40
The empirical literature is relatively thin, but two non-economists, Jong-sung You and
Sanjeev Khagram, recently completed a major study.  Using two-stage least squares and various41
instrumental variables, they examine the relationship between income inequality and corruption
in 129 countries. Controlling for economic development, trade openness, natural resource
abundance, democracy, federalism, religion, origin of legal system, and ethno-linquistic
fractionalization and using different measures of corruption, they find a statistically significant,
robust, and powerful correlation. In simpler models without instrumental variables, they find that
a “one-standard-deviation reduction in income inequality” (which is a decrease in the GINI
measure of 0.11) is associated with between .21 and .30 standard deviation “improvement in
corruption.”  In more complex models using instrumental variables to test causation, their “best42
estimate of the causal effect that inequality has on corruption,” “a one-standard deviation
reduction in inequality causes about a two third standard deviation improvement in freedom from
corruption.”43
Whereas there is little empirical work on the idea that inequality causes corruption, there
is a significant amount of work that corruption causes inequality. (Indeed, You and Khagram test
for and find causation in both directions ). As a result, inequality can lead to corruption, which44
 Id. at 153.45
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causes more inequality, which causes more corruption. “As a result, many societies are likely to
be trapped in vicious circles of inequality and corruption. This mutually reinforcing relationship
possibly explains why income inequality persists within countries over time.”45
III. INEQUALITY DECREASES GROWTH
As I noted at the outset, economics famously identifies the benefit of meritocratic
inequality: that the promise of greater rewards elicits more socially productive effort and risk-
taking. Moreover, according to some economic development theorists, inequality is desirable for
ensuring that there is a wealthy class that has the resources to invest in capital. Against these
causal mechanisms, however, economic theory identifies a number of ways that inequality (and
particularly non-meritocratic inequality) can produce the opposite result of decreasing growth.
The empirical surprise is that many studies find that the net effect of the inequality around the
world is to decrease growth. If so, then up to some point decreasing inequality will increase
social wealth. Contrary to the conventional assumption of a tradeoff between equity and
efficiency, if inequality impedes growth (up to some point), then under almost any plausible
social welfare function, decreasing inequality (up to some point) increases social welfare.
The conventional economic concern is that the threat of massive redistribution will
undermine growth. For this reason, high levels of inequality can cause investors to feel uneasy
about a nation’s future. One risk is that the have-nots will win the political struggle and impose
confiscatory taxes, expropriation, or nationalization. Even if this redistribution never occurs,
severe inequality poses the ever-present risk that it will. A second risk is that, even without
redistribution, the political struggle between rich and poor will turn violent. Perhaps the rich will
 Alberto Alesina, Sule Ozler, Nouriel Roubini & Phillip Swagel, Political Instability and Economic46
Growth, 1 J. ECON . GROWTH  189 (1996);  Roland Benabou, “Inequality and Growth,” 11 NBER Macroeconomics
Annual 11 (1996); Roberto Perotti, Growth, Income Distribution, and Democracy: What the Data Say, 1 J. ECON .
GROWTH  149 (1996).
 See 2006  WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, Overview 8-9 (World Bank 2005): “The second channel47
through which inequity affects long-run processes of development is the shaping of economic and political
institutions. . . . [U]nequal power leads to the formation of institutions that perpetuate inequalities in power, status,
and wealth—and that typically are also bad for the investment, innovation, and risk-taking that underpin long-term
growth.” See also id. at chapter 6.
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win the political struggle, but only at the cost of considerable disorder. Both risks – massive
redistribution and violent political turmoil – lower the expected return on investment and
therefore makes investment less likely, which makes growth less likely. Indeed, there is empirical
evidence that income inequality increases social conflict and instability as measured by protests,
strikes, government turnover, political violence, coups, and revolutions.  Depending on the46
degree of inequality, modest redistribution may produce gains from political stability and the
reduced risk of confiscatory redistribution that more than compensate for any loss in optimal
incentives the modest redistribution produces.
Related to the risk of redistribution is the corruption of institutions discussed in the prior
section, which the World Bank recently recognized as one of the key mechanisms by which
inequality impedes growth.  In a democracy, the rich block massive redistribution by using their47
wealth to gain control of key institutions, such as the courts. But if the wealthy corrupt the courts
and other institutions, they will not stop at using them merely to block redistribution to the poor.
Instead, the wealthy will buy political influence to redistribute wealth away from the poor to
themselves, to shield themselves from market competition, and, in general, to entrench their
 Inequality may also retard democratic developments, which may in the long run produce greater growth.48
See, e.g., Francois & Thierry Verdier, Oligarchy, Democracy, Inequality and Growth, 62 J. DEVELOPM ENTAL ECON .
285 (2000); Daron Acemoglu, The Form of Property Rights: Oligarchic vs. Democratic Societies (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 10037-2005).
 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson “Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective” (2002).49
 See Glaeser, Scheinkman, & Shleifer, supra note xx, at 201.50
 Id. Glaeser, Scheinkman & Schleifer appear to include contract enforcement in their analysis. If the51
wealthy control the courts, then they will find it difficult to make their promises to the non-rich appear to be binding,
which undermines the productivity of promises for future exchange.
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position of power.  If so, then corruption attenuates any link between merit and wealth. Wealth48
becomes less and less a function of socially productive effort or risk-taking and more simply a
function of political influence. Entrenchment may not only take the form of blocking policies to
redistribute to the poor or middle class, but also to block technological changes that could have a
similar effect. When technical innovation threatens to disrupt the status quo in unpredictable
ways or in ways that will predictably disperse power, elites will corrupt institutions to suppress
the innovation. Economists Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson use this idea to explain,
among other things, the Russian aristocratic opposition to industrialization.  49
Corruption has other negative effects. Undermining the rule of law will chill investment
by the non-rich. Glaeser, Scheinkman, & Shleifer point out that, if the wealthy corrupt the
judiciary, then they will “expect to prevail in any court case brought against them.”  If so, “they50
would not respect the property rights of others,” or one might add, the contract rights. “The
breakdown in property rights in turn deters investment, at least by the potential victims, with
adverse consequences for economic growth.”  Finally, inequality distorts lobbying. Economists51
view lobbying as providing imperfectly informed government officials with potentially useful
information about the costs and benefits of proposed regulation. Talk is cheap, but the actual
 See Joan Esteban & Debraj Ray, Inequality, Lobbying, and Resource Allocation, 96 AM ER. ECON . REV.52
257 (2006).
 See 2006  WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, Overview 7-8 and Chapter 5 (World Bank 2005).53
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costs of lobbying can signal genuine information about what the lobbying organization expects
from the regulation. Economists Joan Esteban and Debraj Ray recently observed, however, that
inequality distorts this informational signal because wealthy firms or groups will be willing to
outspend opponents simply because of their relative wealth.  The result is a greater public52
misallocation of resources even when government is not corrupt.
Besides redistribution and corruption, inequality may also undermine growth by its affect
on education and human capital, which the World Bank recognizes as another key mechanism by
which inequality impedes growth.  The point here is that people have widely different types and53
levels of talent and an economy maximizes its growth by giving people the education or training
that best exploits their talent. Put differently, given scarce educational resources, efficiency
involves matching the right type and level of those resources to the individual. We may trust that
individuals with sufficient resources have the incentive to educate themselves up to the level that
maximizes their return (net of education costs). The problem is that the talented poor may lack
the resources to educate themselves efficiently. If capital markets were perfect, then poverty
would pose no obstacle to the ideal allocation of educational resources because talented but poor
individuals would be able to borrow sufficiently to invest in their human capital, i.e., to get
whatever education or training would maximize their net earnings. But because capital markets
are imperfect, the poor will not be able to borrow up to the efficient amount and will under-invest
 See Perotti, supra note xx; Oded Galor & Joseph Zeira, Income Distribution and Macroeconomics, 6054
REV. ECON . STUDIES 35 (1993).
  See Era Dabla-Norris & Mark Gradstein, The Distributional Bias of Public Education: Causes and55
Consequences, IMF Working Paper 214 (2004); Abhijit V. Banerjee & Lakshmi Iyer, History, Institutions and
Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India, 95 AM ER. ECON . REV. 1190 (2005).
“Assortative matching” in marriage also compounds the problem. See, e.g., Raquel Fernandez & Richard Rogerson,
Sorting and Long-Run Inequality, 116 QUART. J. ECON . 1305 (2001).
 For a review, see Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1 (1992). For more recent56
research, see, e.g., F. Alpizar, F. Carlsson & O. Johansson-Stenman, How Much Do We Care About Absolute Versus
Relative Income and Consumption? 56 J. ECON . BEHAVIOR &  ORG. 405 (2005); G. Kirchsteiger, The Role of Envy in
Ultimatum Games, 25 J. ECON . BEHAVIOR &  ORG. 373 (1994); O. Johansson-Stenman, F. Carlsson & D. Daruvala,
Measuring Future Grandparents’ Preferences for Equality and Relative Standing, 112 ECON . J. 362 (2005).
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in their training and education. The result is to waste human talent.  Aside from imperfections in54
capital markets, the rich may seek to entrench their power by directing a disproportionate share
of public resources to the education of their own children.55
Now I have stated the main three reasons economists give to believe that inequality works
against growth (fear of redistribution, corruption of institutions, waste of human capital). There
are however at least two more possibilities. A less orthodox mechanism is envy. Although
economics usually focuses on absolute desires, some economists have observed that individuals
care greatly about their relative desires, i.e., about their position relative to some referent group
or individual.  Thus, holding absolute wealth constant, individuals seem to gain utility from56
being relatively wealthier than others and to lose utility from being relatively poorer than others.
Obviously, the satisfaction or frustration of these relative preferences has a direct affect on
individual and hence social welfare. But there are also possible indirect effects. For example, the
negative feeling those with less have for those with more – envy – might impede economic
productivity. Although having less than others may create a greater to perform, it may also lead
to frustration, resignation, and hostility, all of which may cause individuals to behave in less
 Benno Torgler, Sascha L. Schmidt & Bruno S. Frey, “Relative Income Position and Performance: An57
Empirical Panel Analysis,” The Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Note di Lavoro Series Index (Feb. 2006).
 Id. at 15.58
 Id. at 24-25.59
 B ENJAM IN M. FRIEDM AN , THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOM IC GROWTH  (2005).60
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productive ways. Only empirical analysis can resolve which effect is likely to predominate.
Three economists, Benno Torgler, Sascha L. Schmidt and Bruno S. Frey, recently studied
this issue at the micro level, asking whether inequality among co-workers affected their
productivity.  Like other recent studies of worker productivity, they focused on sports, where the57
data permits clear measurement of pay and productivity. Specifically, they examined the pay and
performance of 1040 professional soccer players in Germany’s premier soccer league
Bundesliga, over eight seasons. Although the absolute level of pay increases performance,
controlling for a variety of factors, they find that inequality of pay on a team “has a strong
negative impact for all types of performance” by its players – goals, assists, shots, ball contacts,
duels and duels won.  Moreover, the negative effect on an individual is much larger the longer58
that individual plays on a given team.  Newcomers are less effected, which suggests that the key59
is the referent group – the longer an individual plays on a team, the more likely he is to use
teammates as a referent group, and the more that the large differences in pay adversely affect his
performance. In short, inequality increases envy, which decreases group performance.
Related to this micro-level finding is a similar society-wide claim by Harvard economist
Benjamin Friedman. In a recent book, Friedman analyzes the relationship between economic
growth and political tolerance.  Friedman defends the importance of growth by claiming that it60
tends to foster pluralism, tolerance of diversity and dissent, and commitment to democracy.
 Friedman does not draw the connection – perhaps it would sound too Marxist – but one might imagine61
that the factionalization he discusses is partly connected to the redistributive struggle between rich and poor in that
the rich may seek to defend against the political wrath of the non-rich by encouraging political divisions and conflict
among the non-rich.
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Though nations do not inevitably become democratic or tolerant merely because they achieve
economic prosperity, those that remain absolutely poor virtually never become tolerant or
democratic. Friedman’s explains the causal connection as a matter of an individual’s comparison
to a reference group. When a person is making more money each year, he tends to use his own
past as his basis for comparison and feels optimistic and positive about other groups. But when
an individual’s wages are stagnant, he is more likely to compare himself to others and to worry or
believe that others are gaining at his expense. He is then more likely to support public policies
aimed at harming the individuals he blames, such as polices that suppress immigration, minority
racial or religious groups, or political dissent. The point here is analogous to the above
discussion: just as a political struggle between the rich and the poor is bad for the economy; so
may be every sort of intense political struggle, including between competing factions of non-
rich.61
Friedman focuses on growth not inequality, but relevant to the current discussion,
Friedman says that the tolerance effect he describes occurs only for individuals who personally
benefit from economic growth. Whatever the state of the nation’s economy, if the individual’s
wages do not grow, then he will remain envious and intolerant of others.  Thus, Friedman links
his thesis about the moral consequences of growth to “a rising standard of living for the clear
majority of citizens.” “Economic progress needs to be broadly based if it is to foster social and
 Id. at 6. See also Justina A.V. Fischer & Benno Torgler, “Does Envy Destroy Social Fundamentals? The62
Impact of Relative Income Position on Social Capital,” University of St. Gallen Dept. of Econ. Discussion Paper No.
2006-04 (January 2006).
 Halvor Mehlum, Karl Ove Moene, &Ragnar Torvik, Crime Induced Poverty Traps, 77 J. DEVELOPM ENT63
ECON. 325  (2005).
 See Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?, 84 AM ER. ECON . REV. 60064
(1994).
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political progress.”62
As a final causal mechanism, recall the point of a prior section that inequality increases
crime. In turn, crime also diminishes economic productivity. Crime prompts potential victims to
invest in defensive measures. Some of those measures are themselves inefficient in that they only
displace crime to other victims without decreasing the level of crime. “The club” is an example if
car thieves can easily see the device and move on to the next car. But even if the defensive
measure decreases the level of crime, it also increases the costs of producing goods. If increased
risk of crime cause manufacturers and retailers to devote more resources to preventing theft of
their goods (by buying locks, alarms, cameras, security guards, etc.), then the same quantity of
goods effectively costs more to supply to consumers. If consumers must invest more heavily in
defensive measures to protect their goods from theft, then the preference-satisfaction those goods
supply now costs more. According to some economists, there is the possibility here of a “poverty
trap” in which poverty causes crime, which impedes economic growth, which preserves poverty
and high crime rates. “Economic stagnation explains rising crime and rising crime, in turn,
explains the economic stagnation.”63
Those are the theories. The empirical evidence on the connection between inequality and
growth is large and growing. One of the early studies is Persson and Tabellini.  They first64
 Id. at 607-08, 612.65
 See Alberto Alesina & Dani Rodrik, Distributive Politics and Economic Growth, 109 QUART. J. ECON .66
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conducted a time series analysis of nine nations over 155 years and followed up with a regression
of growth and inequality in 56 nations since World War II. In each case, they found a statistically
and economically significant connection: a one standard deviation increase in the income share
of the top 20 percent lowers the average annual growth rate by approximately half a percentage
point.  A number of other studies from the 1990s support this finding.  In 1999, economists65 66
reviewing this and other studies concluded that “the traditional argument that redistribution is
detrimental to incentives and growth is strongly challenged.”67
Other studies reached different results. Economist Robert Barro examined panel data for
approximately 100 countries over 35 years and found no overall relationship between inequality
and growth.  When he divided the countries into rich and poor, he found that inequality68
appeared to produce less growth in poor countries but more growth in wealthy countries.
Economist Kristin Forbes also examined panel data and found an overall positive effect of
inequality on growth.  Using expanded data on on 45 countries over 30 years, she found that “[a]69
ten-point increase in a country’s gini coefficient is correlated with a 1.3 percent increase in
average annual growth over the next five years.”  Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer ran a cross70
 See Glaeser, Scheinkman, & Shleifer, supra note xx, at 214-15.71
 See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note xx, Overview at 2.72
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country comparison that controlled for the strength of each nation’s “rule of law” and found that
inequality decreased growth only in countries with below mean rule of law measures, while
inequality had no effect in nations with strong rule of law.  They took this as evidence of their71
particular theory that inequality decreases growth by corrupting institutions; when the institutions
are sufficiently strong, inequality has no effect on growth.
In any event, the World Bank considered these studies and concluded in late 2005 that
material inequality (and other forms of inequity such as discrimination and stereotyping) were a
major obstacle to the economic development of poor nations: “The main message is that equity is
complementary, in some fundamental respects, to the pursuit of long-term prosperity. Institutions
and policies that promote a level playing field . . . contribute to sustainable growth and
development.”72
I end this section with a study by economist William Easterly, also from late 2005.73
Easterly notes that the weaknesses in all of these studies: the imperfect data on inequality over
time and across nations.  He then proposes an “instrumental” technique to avoid that weakness.74
Economic historians have identified “factor endowment” as a key cause of inequality within
nations.  A central example of which is the difference between sugar cane and wheat farming.75
Sugar cane farming has economies of scale that lead to very large plantations (often with slave
 Easterly, supra note xx, at 2.76
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labor) that “were historically associated with high inequality.”  Wheat farming, by contrast,76
could be achieved on family farms “and thus promoted the growth of a large middle class.”  In77
case studies, economic historians find that simple agricultural differences of this type explain
significance differences in material equality and the evolution of political institutions.  If so,78
then the ratio of sugar to wheat in a nation is a useful “instrument” for measuring equality there.
The instrument is useful first because there is good data on crops grown across different nations
over time. The instrument is also useful because, according to the economic theory of
comparative advantage, the crops grown should have no direct effect on long term growth. Thus,
any effect the ratio has can be attributed to the effect in producing inequality, which then affects
long term growth.
 Easterly finds that the crop ratio strongly predict growth: the heavier farming of sugar
cane is a “large and significantly significant hindrance” to growth.  The effect remains when79
Easterly controls for ethnic fractionalization, legal origins, and tropical location.  In addition, he80
finds evidence for the mechanisms by which inequality operates: the higher farming of sugar
cane leads to significant reductions in institutional quality and schooling.  81
In sum, the empirical debate continues, but there is strong reason to think that, at least in
many nations of the world, inequality impedes economic growth. At some levels of inequality,
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there is not a trade-off between efficiency and equity. Instead, policies that reduce inequality may
produce greater growth as well as greater equity.
IV. CONCLUSION
To be sure, nothing in the economic theory or empiricism I have reviewed suggests that
economists wish to rethink the benefits of free markets, which essentially require inequality. The
expectation of inequality creates incentives for productive behavior; given that people do take
different levels of risk and put forth different levels of effort, the expectation of inequality
depends in turn on the reality of inequality. Nonetheless, like everything else in economics, there
is some optimal degree of inequality. The concept of wealth maximization in law and economics
might seem to suggest that the optimal degree is whatever amount any free market produces, i.e.,
that one should simply ignore the distributional consequences of maximizing total wealth. That
implication is false simply as a matter of welfare economics, which is appropriately concerned
about any effects – including distribution – on human welfare. Here, I have identified only a few
of those distributional effects. Economic theory and empiricism suggests that material inequality
increases crime, increases corruption, and, at some levels, decreases growth. Inequality has costs
as well as benefits. For economics, the optimal level of inequality likely to be less than the
market supplies.
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